A true market bubble isn't defined by high valuations but by collective psychology. The most dangerous bubbles form when skepticism disappears and everyone believes prices will rise indefinitely. Constant debate about a bubble indicates the market hasn't reached that state of universal conviction.
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A true bubble, like the dot-com crash, involves stock prices falling over 50% and staying depressed for years, with capital infusion dropping similarly. Short-term market corrections don't meet this historical definition. The current AI boom, despite frothiness, doesn't exhibit these signs yet.
Despite a massive tech stock run-up, key sentiment indicators and surveys of major asset allocators show caution, not the extreme bullishness seen in bubbles like the dot-com era. This suggests the market may not be at its absolute peak yet.
A true market bubble is a psychological phenomenon requiring near-universal belief that it isn't a bubble. The fact that so many people are actively questioning whether AI is in a bubble indicates the market has not reached the necessary state of widespread 'capitulation' from skeptics.
Widespread public debate about whether a market is in a bubble is evidence that it is not. A true financial bubble requires capitulation, where nearly everyone believes the high valuations are justified and the skepticism disappears. As long as there are many vocal doubters, the market has not reached the euphoric peak that precedes a crash.
Historical bubbles, like the dot-com era, occur only when everyone capitulates and believes prices can only go up. According to Ben Horowitz, the constant debate and anxiety about a potential AI bubble is paradoxically the strongest evidence that the market has not yet reached the required state of collective delusion.
Asnes employs a strict framework before using the word "bubble." He will only apply the label after exhaustively attempting—and failing—to construct a set of assumptions, however improbable, that could justify observed market prices. This separates mere overvaluation from true speculative mania disconnected from reality.
Contrary to intuition, widespread fear and discussion of a market bubble often precede a final, insane surge upward. The real crash tends to happen later, when the consensus shifts to believing in a 'new economic model.' This highlights a key psychological dynamic of market cycles where peak anxiety doesn't signal an immediate top.
In a late-stage bubble, investor expectations are so high that even flawless financial results, like Nvidia's record-breaking revenue, fail to boost the stock price. This disconnect signals that market sentiment is saturated and fragile, responding more to narrative than fundamentals.
Analysis of the dot-com bubble shows a significant delay between insider discussion of a bubble, mainstream media coverage, and the actual market peak. The New Yorker profiled analyst Mary Meeker as "The Woman in the Bubble" in 1999, yet the stock market didn't peak for another 11 months, indicating that media validation of a bubble doesn't signal an immediate crash.
A market isn't in a bubble just because some assets are expensive. According to Cliff Asness, a true bubble requires two conditions: a large number of stocks are overvalued, and their prices cannot be justified under any reasonable financial model, eliminating plausible high-growth scenarios.
