AQR's Cliff Asnes argues that markets are becoming less efficient due to social media. It destroys the independence required for the 'wisdom of crowds' to function, creating feedback loops that amplify biases and lead to bouts of irrationality, similar to how it has made politics more extreme.
Cliff Asnes explains that integrating machine learning into investment processes involves a crucial trade-off. While AI models can identify complex, non-linear patterns that outperform traditional methods, their inner workings are often uninterpretable, forcing a departure from intuitively understood strategies.
AQR's Cliff Asnes highlights that a prolonged period of underperformance is psychologically and professionally more damaging than a sharper, shorter drop. Enduring a multi-year drawdown erodes client confidence and forces painful business decisions, even if the manager's conviction in their strategy remains high.
AQR's founder argues that markets are fundamentally "voting mechanisms" where price is a dollar-weighted average of opinions. Arbitrage is limited because correcting a mispricing becomes progressively riskier for less reward. Therefore, if a misguided belief is backed by enough capital, it can dominate and push prices away from fundamental value.
Asnes employs a strict framework before using the word "bubble." He will only apply the label after exhaustively attempting—and failing—to construct a set of assumptions, however improbable, that could justify observed market prices. This separates mere overvaluation from true speculative mania disconnected from reality.
Despite decades of evidence, there is no agreement on why factors like "value" (cheap stocks outperforming) work. The debate is split between rational risk-based explanations (Fama's view that they are inherently riskier) and behavioral ones (Shiller's view that investors make systematic errors). This uncertainty persists at the core of quant investing.
Cliff Asnes is surprised that moving from 0% to 5% interest rates didn't curb speculative froth more. His theory is that a long period of "free money" may have permanently altered investor psychology and risk perception, and these behavioral shifts don't simply revert when monetary policy normalizes.