VC funds between $50M and a few hundred million can be a 'dead zone' for general partners. They are too large to benefit from the quick-carry potential of small funds but too small to generate significant management fees like mega-funds, making the personal economics challenging for managers.
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The private markets industry is bifurcating. General Partners (GPs) must either scale massively with broad distribution to sell multiple products, or focus on a highly differentiated, unique strategy. The middle ground—being a mid-sized, undifferentiated firm—is becoming the most difficult position to defend.
Many sub-$500M venture funds are over-invested and under-reserved. While venture capitalists like Josh Wolfe predict a 50% failure rate for these "minnows," the Limited Partners (LPs) who fund them are even more bearish, believing the involuntary extinction rate will be closer to 90%.
Applying Conway's Law to venture, a firm's strategy is dictated by its fund size and team structure. A $7B fund must participate in mega-rounds to deploy capital effectively, while a smaller fund like Benchmark is structured to pursue astronomical money-on-money returns from earlier stages, making mega-deals strategically illogical.
Micah Rosenbloom of Founder Collective argues that keeping fund sizes small is a strategic choice. It aligns the firm with founders by making smaller, life-changing exits viable, maintaining founder optionality, and focusing on multiples rather than management fees from a large AUM.
The fund-of-funds model, often seen as outdated, finds a modern edge by focusing on small, emerging VC managers. These funds offer the highest potential returns but are difficult for most LPs to source, evaluate, and access. This creates a specialized niche for fund-of-funds that can navigate this opaque market segment effectively.
The primary risk to a VC fund's performance isn't its absolute size but rather a dramatic increase (e.g., doubling) from one fund to the next. This forces firms to change their strategy and write larger checks than their conviction muscle is built for.
A smaller fund size enables investments in seemingly niche but potentially lucrative sectors, such as software for dental labs. A larger fund would have to pass on such a deal, not because the founder is weak, but because the potential exit isn't large enough to satisfy their fund return model.
Before GPs can successfully tap into the retail market, they must recognize the immense operational costs. Managing, reporting for, and administering funds with thousands of small investors has a high break-even point. Without the ability to achieve significant scale, the economics of these products are unworkable.
True alpha in venture capital is found at the extremes. It's either in being a "market maker" at the earliest stages by shaping a raw idea, or by writing massive, late-stage checks where few can compete. The competitive, crowded middle-stages offer less opportunity for outsized returns.
David George of Andreessen Horowitz reveals that contrary to the belief that smaller funds yield higher multiples, a16z's best-performing fund is a $1B vehicle. This success is driven by capturing enough ownership in massive winners like Databricks and Coinbase, demonstrating that fund size can be an advantage in today's market where value creation extends into later private stages.
