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During the 2008 financial crisis, Madison Realty Capital's open-ended fund faced massive redemption requests. To protect all LPs, especially one who invested just before Lehman's collapse, they gated the fund. This strategic move ensured all investors were treated equally rather than allowing a "first-out" advantage.
While other private credit managers capped withdrawals amid market panic, Blackstone took a different approach. It used its own balance sheet and $400 million from its executives to ensure all investors could pull their money out. This was a unique move to signal confidence and protect its brand, especially with retail investors.
Redemption gates are critical for managing liability-side risks like investor runs, giving funds time to manage outflows. However, they are ineffective against asset-side problems. If underlying loan portfolios suffer high default rates, the fund's value will still deteriorate, and gates can't prevent those ultimate losses.
The private credit market is exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of the 2007-2008 subprime crisis. These include major funds blocking investor withdrawals ("gating") and large banks proactively disclosing their exposure, suggesting growing internal anxiety and a desire to manage public perception before a potential downturn.
Goldman Sachs avoids the term "semi-liquid" because it provides false comfort. The liquidity gates on these evergreen funds are a feature, not a bug, designed to prevent fire-selling assets. They are most likely to be activated when investors are clamoring for redemptions.
Permira's Ian Jackson argues that redemption limits in retail-oriented credit funds are working as intended to manage the mismatch between investor demand for liquidity and illiquid private loan portfolios.
Limiting redemptions in private credit funds, often seen negatively, is a crucial defense. It prevents a run on the fund by stopping a mismatch where illiquid loans would have to be sold to meet liquid redemption demands, which could cause a collapse.
Fears of a systemic private credit collapse are mitigated by a key structural feature: the manager's ability to cap redemptions at 5%. This prevents a forced mass liquidation of assets to meet redemption requests, containing the liquidity crisis to a small part of the market and averting a downward price spiral.
Many investors in 'evergreen' or 'semi-liquid' funds like BDCs are surprised when they can't withdraw their money. These funds have redemption gates (e.g., only 5% of AUM per quarter) written into their documents, a detail often missed by investors rushing into the asset class without proper diligence.
The 5% quarterly redemption limit in non-traded BDCs is not a panic-induced "gate" but a deliberate structural feature. It aligns investor liquidity with the illiquid nature of the underlying loans, preventing forced sales at distressed prices and protecting the fund's integrity for all investors. The term "gate" misrepresents this contractual design.
The 2008 crisis revealed a fatal flaw in Madison's open-ended fund structure, which was ill-suited for private credit. For their second fund, they pivoted to a closed-end model. This forced them to completely replace their existing LPs with a new, more stable institutional base of pensions and endowments.