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Redemption gates are critical for managing liability-side risks like investor runs, giving funds time to manage outflows. However, they are ineffective against asset-side problems. If underlying loan portfolios suffer high default rates, the fund's value will still deteriorate, and gates can't prevent those ultimate losses.
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A downturn in private credit can escalate rapidly via a feedback loop. The cycle begins with redemptions and defaults, leading to forced selling of fund assets. This reveals a lack of deep liquidity, causing prices to gap down, which confirms investor fears and triggers more redemptions, creating a self-reinforcing downward spiral.
Private credit is being sold to retail investors through products that appear liquid like stocks but are not. These "semi-liquid" funds have clauses allowing them to halt redemptions during market stress, trapping investor capital precisely when they want it most, creating a "run-on-the-bank" panic.
Recent negative headlines about private credit stem from illiquid private funds with redemption gates, not publicly traded BDCs (Business Development Companies). These public BDCs use permanent capital, meaning they don't face investor runs or forced asset sales.
Goldman Sachs avoids the term "semi-liquid" because it provides false comfort. The liquidity gates on these evergreen funds are a feature, not a bug, designed to prevent fire-selling assets. They are most likely to be activated when investors are clamoring for redemptions.
Funds offer investors quarterly liquidity while holding illiquid, 5-7 year corporate loans. This duration mismatch creates the same mechanics as a bank run, without FDIC insurance. When redemption requests surge, funds are forced to sell long-term assets at fire-sale prices, triggering a potential collapse.
The structure of modern private credit vehicles, particularly non-traded BDCs, replicates a classic asset-liability mismatch by funding illiquid loans with potentially liquid investor capital. This fundamental flaw predictably leads to liquidity crunches during redemption waves, which can escalate into broader credit crises as forced selling begins.
Permira's Ian Jackson argues that redemption limits in retail-oriented credit funds are working as intended to manage the mismatch between investor demand for liquidity and illiquid private loan portfolios.
Fears of a systemic private credit collapse are mitigated by a key structural feature: the manager's ability to cap redemptions at 5%. This prevents a forced mass liquidation of assets to meet redemption requests, containing the liquidity crisis to a small part of the market and averting a downward price spiral.
If redemption requests outpace inflows, private credit funds are forced to sell assets. They will naturally sell their most liquid, highest-quality loans first. This creates a death spiral, leaving the remaining portfolio more leveraged and concentrated with lower-quality, harder-to-sell assets.
When facing a downturn or redemption pressures, private credit funds cannot easily sell their troubled, illiquid loans. Instead, they are forced to sell their high-quality, liquid assets, creating contagion risk in otherwise healthy public markets.
