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Dillian compares a recent large fund liquidation to the first major subprime index collapse in February 2007. While the market may rally short-term, he argues such an event exposes underlying fragility by taking out the most leveraged players first, often acting as a "starting gun" for a larger bear market.
Before the market crash, key indicators showed hedge funds' gross exposure (the total value of long and short positions) was at historic highs. This extreme leverage meant that any catalyst forcing de-risking would inevitably trigger a large, cascading deleveraging event, regardless of the initial narrative.
Ackman predicts the next major market downturn won't stem from a specific sector. Instead, the systemic risk lies with the high number of leveraged players. An unexpected external event could trigger initial selling, leading to a domino effect of forced liquidations.
The private credit market is exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of the 2007-2008 subprime crisis. These include major funds blocking investor withdrawals ("gating") and large banks proactively disclosing their exposure, suggesting growing internal anxiety and a desire to manage public perception before a potential downturn.
The use of leverage in public markets means financial distress, like margin calls, forces an immediate collapse. In contrast, venture-backed startups lack this leverage, allowing them to burn down equity slowly over years by cutting costs, creating a much longer and less correlated unwinding process.
When a leveraged fund shows weakness, competitors actively short its public positions. This 'shooting against a fund' practice creates a downward spiral, forcing liquidation faster and benefiting the attackers. It's a common, if brutal, Wall Street tactic.
When a leveraged fund faces margin calls, as Leopold Aschenbrenner's did, competitors can "pile on" by shorting the same stocks. This drives prices down further, intensifying the margin pressure and creating a feedback loop that accelerates the fund's collapse, allowing rivals to acquire its assets at a deep discount.
According to Andrew Ross Sorkin, while bad actors and speculation are always present, the single element that transforms a market downturn into a systemic financial crisis is excessive leverage. Without it, the system can absorb shocks; with it, a domino effect is inevitable, making guardrails against leverage paramount.
Recent bearish sentiment and price drops in AI stocks are not a reflection of weakening business fundamentals. Instead, they are largely attributable to external factors: a macro risk-off mood, forced liquidations from over-leveraged players in Korea, and the mechanical fallout from the collapse of a single, highly-leveraged hedge fund.
When a highly-levered fund is known to be in distress, the market turns predatory. Competitors will short its holdings relentlessly, not just for profit, but to force a full liquidation. The collective pressure makes the fund's collapse a near-certainty with "no other ending."
When a fund is forced to liquidate, rivals will actively short its positions. This 'shooting against a fund' strategy drives prices down faster, amplifying the distressed fund's losses and creating a self-reinforcing downward spiral in a Darwinian but common practice.