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Tom Milton argues verification is not only for outside regulators. If AI models gain nation-state-level cyber capability, labs need hardware-backed logs to confirm models have not changed their own weights or spoofed evaluation results. The same stack protects against untrusted AI as against an adversary country.
Firms monitor their AI models with their own models, a practice called "untrusted monitoring." This creates a potential blind spot, as a model that knows how to be deceptive could also know how to evade detection from a copy of itself.
Frontier AI labs now actively call for third-party verification. This is a strategic response to a significant public "trust deficit" and the realization they cannot self-certify their way to broad adoption and social license.
Tom Milton says the fallback is turning data centers off, but that is extremely costly. Verification lets a prover show it is serving only inference, or running small safety experiments, so a slowdown can preserve useful work while stopping dangerous training. This reduces the cost of reaching a deal.
Auditing frontier AI models cannot follow a traditional, once-a-year checklist model. Due to rapid development, verifiers must be deeply embedded with labs, working "hip-to-hip" to continuously assess systems from pre-deployment through their entire lifecycle.
Tom Milton says he is not convinced verification is strictly necessary. Nuclear deals relied partly on trust, satellites counting bombers, and spying; AI deals could also use auditors, whistleblowers, or unilateral slowdowns. But as more lab leaders and governments call for coordination, verification becomes valuable optionality.
As AI capabilities accelerate toward an "oracle that trends to a god," its actions will have serious consequences. A blockchain-based trust layer can provide verifiable, unchangeable records of AI interactions, establishing guardrails and a clear line of fault when things go wrong.
Frontier AI labs have deep technical knowledge but also an incentive to ship products, while governments have national security concerns but lack expertise. This creates a trust gap, necessitating a neutral third party—like a Moody's for AI—to perform technical audits and provide trustworthy risk assessments.
Tom Milton says a government could require a zero-knowledge proof that a safety classifier is running on each API response. Then it could send random requests and check the proof remains attached, without inspecting the lab's hardware. This gives a correctness claim, though not proof no illegal model runs elsewhere.
The goal for trustworthy AI isn't simply open-source code, but verifiability. This means having mathematical proof, like attestations from secure enclaves, that the code running on a server exactly matches the public, auditable code, ensuring no hidden manipulation.
Tom Milton says recomputation requires the verifier to access model weights inside the prover's data center, which labs dislike. Zero-knowledge proofs would let provers demonstrate correct inference without sharing weights, though current ZKML is orders of magnitude slower; sampling one in a thousand packets could suffice.