Voyager CEO Al Sandrock outlines a focused strategy: remain specialists in neurology, but broaden the therapeutic modalities (gene therapy, proteins, oligonucleotides). This allows them to pursue well-validated CNS targets that are considered "undruggable" by traditional small molecules, which have historically been the only option for crossing the blood-brain barrier.

While the FDA is often blamed for high trial costs, a major culprit is the consolidated Clinical Research Organization (CRO) market. These entrenched players lack incentives to adopt modern, cost-saving technologies, creating a structural bottleneck that prevents regulatory modernization from translating into cheaper and faster trials.

Amidst growing turmoil at the FDA, a viable strategy is to "invest around" the risk. This involves prioritizing companies whose drugs show clear data on well-understood, validated endpoints, as these are most likely to navigate the current political environment successfully, regardless of leadership changes.

Unicure's setback with its Huntington's gene therapy demonstrates a new political risk at the FDA. A prior agreement on a trial's design can be overturned by new leadership, especially if the data is not overwhelmingly definitive. This makes past regulatory alignment a less reliable indicator of future approval.

After a decade on the market and multiple shifts in endpoints, Sarepta's definitive Phase 3 study for its DMD drugs failed. This outcome casts doubt on the entire accelerated approval framework for slowly progressive diseases, where surrogate endpoints may not translate to clinical benefit, leaving regulators and patients in a difficult position.

Voyager CEO Al Sandrock suggests the 30% average efficacy of new Alzheimer's drugs isn't uniform. Instead, some patients may see a complete halt in progression while others see no benefit. He argues the next critical step is predicting these responders, which will determine whether future therapies like anti-tau agents should be added on or used as a replacement.

The FDA is predicted to approve new PARP inhibitors from trials like AMPLITUDE only for BRCA-mutated patients, restricting use to where data is strongest. This contrasts with the EMA's potential for broader approvals or denials. This highlights the diverging regulatory philosophies that create different drug access landscapes in the US and Europe.

In high-stakes fields like medtech, the "fail fast" startup mantra is irresponsible. The goal should be to "learn fast" instead—maximizing learning cycles internally through research and simulation to de-risk products before they have real-world consequences for patient safety.

The FDA's current leadership appears to be raising the bar for approvals based on single-arm studies. Especially in slowly progressing diseases with variable endpoints, the agency now requires an effect so dramatic it's akin to a parachute's benefit—unmistakable and not subject to interpretation against historical data.