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Former CIA officer John Kiriakou explains that real government control sits with career civil servants below political appointees. While presidents change every four to eight years, institutional bureaucrats remain for decades. When ordered to execute policies they oppose, career officials can simply agree verbally and then ignore directives, knowing political leaders will soon leave while the entrenched bureaucracy endures.
Kasparov argues the greatest danger isn't just high-level political cronies. The critical inflection point is when a "critical mass of the second and third tier of officers of the law and bureaucrats" become loyalists. This cements authoritarian control by taking over the permanent machinery of the state itself.
The CIA specifically favors presidents who arrive without foreign policy experience. Immediately after the election, intelligence officials present highly classified President's Daily Briefs with reports multiple levels above Top Secret. This theatrical display of exclusive inside information seduces inexperienced leaders into feeling like insiders, effectively recruiting them to support agency priorities rather than critically evaluating intelligence agency performance.
Despite public political conflicts and rhetoric from leaders like Trump, career officials and bureaucrats in allied nations continue to cooperate, preserving the functional core of international partnerships. This professional class acts as a stabilizing force against political volatility.
Administrations frequently appoint figures known for a specific ideology to implement the exact opposite policy. This pattern suggests institutional pressures override personal beliefs. For example, Fed chair candidate Kevin Warsh, despite his hawkish reputation, will likely cut rates to align with administration goals.
Government programs often persist despite failure because their complexity is a feature, not a bug. This system prevents average citizens, who are too busy with their lives, from deciphering the waste and holding the "political industrial complex" accountable, thereby benefiting those in power.
In large organizations like the Federal Reserve, task forces are not for discovery but for building a documented, consensus-driven case for decisions the leadership has already made. This creates a paper trail and deflects political criticism for significant policy shifts, lending an air of objective expertise to a chosen path.
The practice of removing experienced, credentialed diplomats and civil servants in favor of loyalists has gutted America's ability to execute complex tasks, from foreign policy to domestic administration. This decline is now becoming painfully obvious.
A substantial portion of government classification is designed to prevent political embarrassment and conceal agency wrongdoing rather than protect national security. According to Kiriakou and former officials, roughly three-quarters of classified material should not be restricted. Internal documents often remain shielded merely because they contain politically inconvenient or revealing details that would disrupt agency public standing.
To improve federal efficiency beyond partisan politics, Oliver Libby proposes creating a Chief Operating Officer for the U.S. government. Modeled after the long-term, cross-administration tenure of the Fed Chair, this role would focus on making government work better for citizens regardless of who is in power.
Geopolitical adversaries with long-term leadership, like Iran, view the U.S.'s frequent changes in administration as a temporary inconvenience rather than a fundamental policy shift. They see the U.S. as an "obnoxious guy on the bus" whom they can simply ignore and outlast by staying their course.