To compete with behemoths like Vanguard, new ETFs must focus on boutique strategies that are too complex, differentiated, or capacity-constrained for trillion-dollar managers. Competing on broad, scalable market beta is futile; the opportunity lies in specialized areas where expertise and smaller scale are advantages.
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The private markets industry is bifurcating. General Partners (GPs) must either scale massively with broad distribution to sell multiple products, or focus on a highly differentiated, unique strategy. The middle ground—being a mid-sized, undifferentiated firm—is becoming the most difficult position to defend.
Contrary to intuition, even a fully systematic, rules-based investment strategy benefits from an active ETF structure. This approach avoids third-party index licensing fees and provides crucial flexibility to delay rebalancing during volatile market events, a cumbersome process for index-based funds.
The fund-of-funds model, often seen as outdated, finds a modern edge by focusing on small, emerging VC managers. These funds offer the highest potential returns but are difficult for most LPs to source, evaluate, and access. This creates a specialized niche for fund-of-funds that can navigate this opaque market segment effectively.
The dominance of low-cost index funds means active managers cannot compete in liquid, efficient markets. Survival depends on creating strategies in areas Vanguard can't easily replicate, such as illiquid micro-caps, niche geographies, or complex sectors that require specialized data and analysis.
A smaller fund size enables investments in seemingly niche but potentially lucrative sectors, such as software for dental labs. A larger fund would have to pass on such a deal, not because the founder is weak, but because the potential exit isn't large enough to satisfy their fund return model.
A major structural disadvantage of ETFs is the inability to close the fund to new capital. Unlike mutual funds or SMAs, an ETF cannot stop inflows. This makes the structure inappropriate for strategies with limited capacity, such as those focused on micro-cap stocks, where large inflows would harm performance.
The idea that venture is splitting into giant platforms and tiny boutiques is flawed. A16z, the largest platform, is structured as a collection of specialized, boutique-sized funds. This model proves that focused, sector-specific funds are the effective unit, even within a mega-firm.
The venture capital landscape is bifurcating. Large, multi-stage funds leverage scale and network, while small, boutique funds win with deep domain expertise. Mid-sized generalist funds lack a clear competitive edge and risk getting squeezed out by these two dominant models.
Newbrook frames its strategy as providing a customized 'Gulfstream' experience for taxable investors, while large alternative firms sell a mass-market '777' product optimized for tax-exempt institutions. This highlights how smaller firms can thrive by creating a superior, tailored solution for a valuable niche market.
Top compounders intentionally target and dominate small, slow-growing niche markets. These markets are unattractive to large private equity firms, allowing the compounder to build a durable competitive advantage and pricing power with little interference from deep-pocketed rivals.
