Protagonist can opt out of its co-development deal with Takeda post-NDA filing. This move triggers a $400 million payment and converts the partnership to a high-royalty model (14-29%). This structure allows them to de-risk commercialization while retaining significant financial upside, effectively creating a lucrative licensing deal on demand.
The nature of biopharma M&A changed dramatically in a year. After a period with no deals over $5 billion, there are now seven or eight such transactions, reflecting a pivot by large pharma to acquire de-risked assets with large market potential to offset looming patent expirations.
After years of focusing on de-risked late-stage products, the M&A market is showing a renewed appetite for risk. Recent large deals for early-stage and platform companies signal a return to an era where buyers gamble on foundational science.
Recent biotech deals are setting new valuation records for companies at specific early stages: preclinical (AbbVie/Capstan, ~$2B), Phase 1 (J&J/Halda, $3B), and pre-Phase 3 (Novartis/Abitivi, $12B). This signals intense demand for de-risked innovation well before late-stage data is available.
Oshkosh structures partnerships to own IP developed jointly with a startup, then licenses it back. This approach, outlined in the initial NDA, gives the large corporation control over patent defense while providing the startup with usage rights, often with market-specific limitations.
For years, Actuate's CEO has shared progress with large pharma companies, not just for early deal-making, but to get critical feedback on their development plan. This helps them understand what data potential acquirers need to see to make a compelling offer later.
When an acquisition fails due to regulatory hurdles, the resulting breakup fee can be a strategic financial boon. For example, Figma received a $1 billion fee from Adobe after their deal was blocked, which functioned as non-dilutive capital to help the company re-accelerate its growth.
Despite a pivotal data readout pending, an acquisition of Abivax could happen beforehand. Historical deals like Merck's acquisition of Prometheus and Pfizer's of Arena show that large pharma companies are willing to 'roll the dice' and pay a premium for pre-data assets when their conviction in the science is high.
Astute biotech leaders leverage the tension between public financing and strategic pharma partnerships. When public markets are down, pursue pharma deals as a better source of capital. Conversely, use the threat of a public offering to negotiate more favorable terms in pharma deals, treating them as interchangeable capital sources.
With patent cliffs looming and mature assets acquired, large pharmaceutical companies are increasingly paying billion-dollar prices for early-stage and even preclinical companies. This marks a significant strategic shift in M&A towards accepting higher risk for earlier innovation.
Ipsen avoids the high-risk, capital-intensive phase of basic research. Instead, its R&D strategy focuses on licensing promising drug candidates from universities and biotechs. The company then leverages its expertise in later-stage development, including toxicology, manufacturing scale-up (CMC), and clinical trials, to bring these de-risked assets to market.