Top-tier universities with AAA credit ratings, able to borrow at 4%, are entertaining private equity deals with effective rates over 15%. This isn't a smart financial strategy; it's a sign of a system-wide crisis where leaders mortgage their future for short-term survival.
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The most imprudent lending decisions occur during economic booms. Widespread optimism, complacency, and fear of missing out cause investors to lower their standards and overlook risks, sowing the seeds for future failures that are only revealed in a downturn.
The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.
The NIL arms race has created a new financing need for universities themselves. They are now turning to private credit funds for multi-million dollar loans to cover recruiting expenses and six-figure commitment bonuses. These loans are secured by the athletic department's predictable TV revenue, creating a stable, asset-backed lending opportunity.
Private equity giants like Blackstone, Apollo, and KKR are marking the same distressed private loan at widely different values (82, 70, and 91 cents on the dollar). This lack of a unified mark-to-market standard obscures true risk levels, echoing the opaque conditions that preceded the 2008 subprime crisis.
Elite universities with massive endowments and shrinking acceptance rates are betraying their public service mission. By failing to expand enrollment, they function more like exclusive 'hedge funds offering classes' that manufacture scarcity to protect their brand prestige, rather than educational institutions aiming to maximize societal impact.
Official non-accrual rates understate private credit distress. A truer default rate emerges when including covenant defaults and 'bad' Payment-in-Kind interest (PIK) from forced renegotiations. These hidden metrics suggest distress levels are comparable to, if not higher than, public markets.
To fix the student debt crisis, universities should be financially on the hook for the first portion of any loan default (e.g., $20,000). This "first loss" position would compel them to underwrite the economic viability of their own degrees, creating a powerful market check against pushing students into overpriced and low-value programs.
Top universities with billion-dollar endowments should lose their tax-free status if they fail to grow enrollment. By artificially limiting admissions, they behave like exclusive luxury brands (e.g., "Birkin bags") that cater to the wealthy, rather than fulfilling their mission as engines of social mobility and public service.
Enormous government borrowing is absorbing so much capital that it's crowding out corporate debt issuance, particularly for smaller businesses. This lack of new corporate supply leads to ironically tight credit spreads for large borrowers. This dynamic mirrors the intense concentration seen in public equity markets.
The problem isn't that college is inherently bad, but that the U.S. system creates a moral hazard. Government-guaranteed, non-dischargeable loans remove any incentive for universities to be competitive on price or deliver value, allowing them to become "parasitic" organizations that saddle students with crippling debt.
