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When venture firms drastically scale funds from tens of millions to billions, the underlying product transforms entirely. Dilution waterfalls on multi-billion-dollar exits yield low multiples for giant funds, driving managers to rely on guaranteed management fees over pure carry.
Applying Conway's Law to venture, a firm's strategy is dictated by its fund size and team structure. A $7B fund must participate in mega-rounds to deploy capital effectively, while a smaller fund like Benchmark is structured to pursue astronomical money-on-money returns from earlier stages, making mega-deals strategically illogical.
As venture capital firms scale to manage billions, their business model shifts from the 'artisan craft' of early-stage investing to an industrial process of asset gathering. This makes it difficult to focus on small, early opportunities and will likely result in IRRs that are no better than the industry average.
Large venture funds generating substantial management fees can become misaligned with founders. Their behavior may shift to prioritize fee generation over maximizing returns, whereas smaller, specialized firms' success is more directly tied to their portfolio companies winning.
The primary risk to a VC fund's performance isn't its absolute size but rather a dramatic increase (e.g., doubling) from one fund to the next. This forces firms to change their strategy and write larger checks than their conviction muscle is built for.
For a megafund like Andreessen Horowitz's $15B vehicle to generate venture returns, it must consistently capture a significant market share—roughly 10%—of all successful outcomes. This transforms their investment strategy into a game of market share acquisition across all stages, not just picking individual winners.
The venture capital model is incentivized for size, not performance. LPs find it easier to deploy capital into large funds, and a GP of a $5B fund returning 1.01x earns more than a GP of a $500M fund returning 3x. This pressures entrepreneurs to accept massive checks at inflated valuations, distorting the market and potentially harming the company.
Contrary to the belief that smaller VC funds generate higher multiples, a16z's data shows their larger funds can outperform. This is driven by the massive expansion of private markets, where significant value is now created in later growth stages (Series C and beyond).
The venture capital return model has shifted so dramatically that even some multi-billion-dollar exits are insufficient. This forces VCs to screen for 'immortal' founders capable of building $10B+ companies from inception, making traditionally solid businesses run by 'mortal founders' increasingly uninvestable by top funds.
Notable Capital's Glenn Solomon argues that massive VC funds are mathematically challenged. Their size forces them to write large, late-stage checks at high valuations, making it difficult to achieve the ownership percentages needed for outsized returns enjoyed by early-stage investors.
Bill Maris argues that smaller funds (<$750M) consistently outperform larger ones due to simple math. A multi-billion-dollar fund needs to return a value that can exceed the entire annual VC-backed exit market to achieve a 3x return. Smaller funds have more achievable targets and can offer founders more focused support.