We scan new podcasts and send you the top 5 insights daily.
While the US and allies can militarily secure convoys through the Strait of Hormuz, this is not a panacea. This action would only restore a fraction of normal shipping volume (est. 20%) and will not immediately restore the trust needed from commercial shipping and insurance companies to resume full operations.
The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz isn't a formal closure. Instead, shippers and producers are adopting a "wait and see" approach, halting flows due to reports of damaged ships and skyrocketing insurance premiums, effectively creating a self-imposed blockade.
Every 10 days the Strait of Hormuz is closed, a 200-million-barrel physical gap is created in the global oil flow. This is not a temporary kink but a massive hole in the supply chain that will take months to resolve and normalize, even long after transit resumes.
Even a best-case combination of all available workarounds—rerouting pipelines, sanctions relief, and the fastest-ever strategic reserve release—would only mitigate 7 million of the 20 million barrels per day lost from a Hormuz closure. This leaves a practically unsolvable 13 million barrel per day shortfall.
Despite government actions like tapping strategic reserves and using alternate pipelines, these measures can only offset about 9 million barrels per day of the 20 million lost from the Strait of Hormuz. This leaves a massive 11 million barrel per day shortfall, dwarfing previous supply shocks.
Dr. Anas Al-Hajji asserts that Iran did not militarily close the Strait of Hormuz. The disruption was caused by European insurance companies canceling policies for tankers under EU solvency rules after an attack near Sri Lanka expanded the perceived risk zone, making transit impossible for uninsured ships.
The Middle East conflict has moved beyond risk to a physical blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. With commercial tankers no longer transiting, nearly 20% of global oil is cut off from markets. This supply disruption, not just a risk premium, is driving oil prices toward $100/barrel.
A potential off-ramp for the conflict is not military victory but a bureaucratic financial solution. By massively increasing the US Development Finance Corporation’s political risk insurance limit, the US could underwrite maritime shipping, incentivizing transit despite the military risk.
While options like releasing strategic reserves and tapping Saudi spare capacity exist, they are temporary stopgaps. These measures fall short of replacing the 20 million barrels per day—over 20% of global production—that flow through the Strait of Hormuz, making its security the paramount issue.
Despite historical precedent, using naval escorts to protect tankers in the Strait of Hormuz is logistically infeasible today. The sheer volume of traffic means convoys would take years to clear the backlog at the pace of 1980s operations, and the cost of protection could exceed the value of the cargo itself.
The US cannot secure the Strait of Hormuz alone. The solution is a US-led military convoy that includes allies like Japan and South Korea, and even unconventional partners like China, who are heavily dependent on the oil route. This international presence creates a stronger deterrent and shares the burden.