![WaterBridge: Oil and Water - [Business Breakdowns, EP.228]](https://megaphone.imgix.net/podcasts/0e99e7ea-98e6-11f0-8315-63bfbdfcc846/image/a11bda9be8779f3e263bf32735c714a2.jpg?ixlib=rails-4.3.1&max-w=3000&max-h=3000&fit=crop&auto=format,compress)
The scarcity of water disposal capacity in the Permian Basin is so critical that major producers like Devon Energy are paying Waterbridge to reserve "pore space" for future wells years in advance. This unprecedented move signals a major power shift to infrastructure owners and indicates strong future pricing power.
In Texas, mineral rights holders have eminent domain-like powers for oil and gas extraction. However, these rights do not extend to water disposal infrastructure. This legal nuance makes it incredibly difficult for new entrants to acquire necessary land easements, creating a powerful competitive moat for established players with existing networks.
As energy producers exhaust "Tier 1" locations and move to deeper, lower-quality "Tier 2" shale formations, the water-to-oil ratio increases significantly. This dynamic creates an organic growth tailwind for water disposal companies, ensuring volume growth even if overall oil production in the Permian Basin remains flat.
Waterbridge's model, with high margins, strong organic growth, and long-term contracts, more closely resembles a hazardous waste company than a midstream energy firm. Analysts argue it deserves a valuation multiple in line with waste players (14-18x EBITDA) versus lower multiples for gathering and processing peers (9x EBITDA).
Once a minor logistical issue, water disposal now represents a significant portion of an oil well's operating expenses. The cost has become so material—up to $6 per barrel of oil equivalent—that it is now a strategic priority managed at the CFO level within major production companies, signaling its critical impact on profitability.
Sponsor Five Point intentionally structured Landbridge (land assets) and Waterbridge (operating assets) as separate public companies. Bundling perpetual, high-optionality land assets within an operating company often leads to the market undervaluing them. This spin-off strategy allows each business to be capitalized appropriately based on its distinct risk profile.
Unlike oil production, which declines sharply, the volume of wastewater from a shale well remains stable or even increases over its multi-decade lifespan. This "water cut" dynamic provides a predictable, long-term revenue stream for water infrastructure companies, decoupling them from oil's steep decline curves.