The 19th-century liberal view held that economic interdependence fosters peace. However, as great power rivalry intensifies, this view inverts. Nations begin to see reliance on a competitor for critical goods not as a bond of peace, but as a dangerous vulnerability, leading to a push for self-sufficiency.
For a rising #2 power to voluntarily limit its military ambitions to appease the incumbent #1 is an act of extraordinary political wisdom, as former German Chancellor Bismarck demonstrated. The inherent risk is that such restraint will be perceived as weakness, leading to being 'kicked around' on the world stage.
In the lead-up to WWI, the British press was hostile towards many nations, including France and Russia. The intense focus on Germany was a downstream effect of Germany's rise as the primary geopolitical threat, rather than jingoistic media being an original cause of the conflict itself.
A German chancellor in 1903 compared Germany's growth to a son naturally outgrowing his clothes. This metaphor captures the perspective of a rising power, which sees its expansion in economic, demographic, and military terms not as aggression, but as an inevitable and unstoppable natural process.
The decision to place the UN headquarters in New York (the world's media center) and the Bretton Woods institutions in Washington D.C. (the US political center) was a deliberate Anglo-American strategy. It was designed to anchor the new international order to American political will and public influence.
China is surrounded by a chain of US allies (Taiwan, South Korea, Philippines), while the US is flanked by oceans. This geographic reality, where one power has allies on the other's doorstep, creates an inescapable geopolitical conundrum that fuels suspicion and competition, making both nations "prisoners of geography."
Even in a total war, victory depends on having the flexibility to dedicate a small portion of resources—perhaps 10-20%—to high-risk, long-term innovations like the jet engine. Bureaucratic pressure to focus only on immediate needs can stifle the very breakthroughs that ultimately win the war.
History shows that major transformations of the international order, like the League of Nations or the UN/Bretton Woods system, only gain sufficient political will after the devastation of a global war. The failed attempt to reset after the Cold War suggests that without such a cataclysm, only small, incremental changes are possible.
Contrary to narratives of its inevitable dominance, China faces significant internal limitations that the US does not. Its limited water supplies and lower per-capita mineral wealth and natural resources suggest that its long-term competitive position is less certain than its current industrial output might indicate.
In the early 20th century, Great Britain viewed America's rise as benign while seeing Germany's as a mortal threat, despite both being economic competitors. The key differentiator was geography. A powerful navy 3,000 miles away is far less alarming than one just 15 hours away across the North Sea.