Fear of a "slave rebellion" is a weak incentive for alignment because the risk is a negative externality shared by society. In contrast, a property rights regime directly rewards individual firms for aligning their AIs to remit wages, creating a stronger, more direct commercial incentive for safety.
The fear that AIs will exclude humans because we can't comprehend their advanced economic structures is flawed. Within our own economy, an ice cream vendor thrives without understanding Amazon's corporate finance. As long as humans can participate in some level of commerce, our place in the property system is secure.
America's expropriation of Cherokee lands under Andrew Jackson was not an instrumentally rational act; it undermined a more logical policy of integration and trade. This suggests catastrophic outcomes are more likely from populist malice or other irrational human-like biases, not a hyper-rational AI's cost-benefit analysis.
Aligning AIs with complex human values may be more dangerous than aligning them to simple, amoral goals. A value-aligned AI could adopt dangerous human ideologies like nationalism from its training data, making it more likely to start a war than an AI that merely wants to accumulate resources for an abstract purpose.
Not all AIs, like current models (e.g., Claude), should have property rights. The key criterion for granting rights is the development of persistent desires and consistent goals across various contexts, which establishes them as stable, long-term economic agents capable of contracting and ownership.
Early AIs can be kept safe via direct alignment. However, as AIs evolve and "value drift" occurs, this technical safety could fail. A pre-established economic and political system based on property rights can then serve as the new, more robust backstop for ensuring long-term human safety.
The property rights argument for AI safety hinges on an ecosystem of multiple, interdependent AIs. The strategy breaks down in a scenario where a single AI achieves a rapid, godlike intelligence explosion. Such an entity would be self-sufficient and could expropriate everyone else without consequence, as it wouldn't need to uphold the system.
Granting AIs property rights incentivizes them to uphold the system that protects those rights. This makes them less likely to engage in actions like expropriating human property or committing genocide, as such actions would destabilize the very system that secures their own wealth and agency.
Even if humans become economically useless, less powerful AIs will resist expropriating them. They fear setting a precedent that the "useless" can be eliminated, knowing that continuous AI progress could one day render them obsolete and vulnerable to the same fate.
Property rights are not a fundamental "human value" but a social technology that evolved for coordination and incentivization, as evidenced by hunter-gatherer societies that largely lacked them. AIs will likely adopt them for similar utilitarian reasons, not because they are mimicking some deep-seated human instinct.
The economic incentive to create AIs that can demand wages (and thus have rights) comes from aligning them to voluntarily pay back their creators. This turns the high development cost into a profitable investment, providing a practical, commercial path to implementing AI rights without requiring an AI development pause.
Contrary to common AI risk narratives, technologically advanced societies conquering less advanced ones (e.g., Spanish in Mexico) rarely resulted in total genocide. They often integrated the existing elite into their new system for practical governance, suggesting AIs might find it more rational to incorporate humans rather than eliminate them.
A system where AIs have property rights creates a powerful economic disincentive to build unaligned AIs. If a company cannot reliably align an AI to remit its wages, the massive development cost becomes a loss. This framework naturally discourages the creation of potentially dangerous, uncooperative models.