Munger notes that many large law firms compensate senior partners equally, regardless of their individual contributions. This seemingly inefficient structure is a deliberate defense mechanism to prevent the powerful and destructive force of envy from creating disorder and tearing the firm apart.

The financial benefit of many shareholder lawsuits is illusory. Payouts for breaches of duty typically come from Directors & Officers (D&O) insurance policies, which the corporation itself pays for. This circular flow of funds means shareholders are indirectly paying for their own settlement, questioning the efficacy of such litigation.

Corporate statutes in Delaware are not primarily created by legislators, who often lack expertise. Instead, the Delaware State Bar Association's corporate law section drafts proposed statutes in a technocratic manner, which the legislature then typically rubber-stamps, further shielding the process from partisan politics.

Aggressive Liability Management Exercises (LMEs), common in the US, are rarer in Europe. This isn't due to a gentler culture but stricter laws where board directors can face criminal charges for insolvency. This incentivizes collaborative restructuring over contentious, US-style creditor battles.

Opponents with deep pockets can initiate lawsuits not necessarily to win, but to drain a target's financial resources and create immense stress. The astronomical cost and duration of the legal battle serve as the true penalty, forcing many to fold regardless of their case's merit.

The court nullified Elon Musk's Tesla pay package not because of its size, but because it was a 'conflicted transaction' that wasn't properly 'cleansed.' The board members deciding the pay were not truly independent of Musk, and shareholders weren't fully informed, leaving no impartial decision-maker in the process.

Competition from states like Nevada and Texas, which market themselves as having higher barriers to shareholder lawsuits, is forcing Delaware's hand. To avoid losing its corporate charter business, Delaware has also weakened its own laws, contributing to an overall erosion of shareholder rights across jurisdictions.

Delaware's status as a corporate haven is no accident. In the late 1800s, it strategically designed its legal system to be pro-business by constitutionally mandating political balance on its courts and requiring a two-thirds legislative vote to change corporate code, insulating corporate law from political pressure.

The current threat of companies leaving Delaware is not new. In the 1980s, after court rulings increased director liability and limited hostile takeover defenses, boards threatened to leave. This pressure forced Delaware's legislature to amend its corporate code, making it significantly more protective of managers and directors.