While increased CapEx signals strength for cloud providers like Microsoft and Google (who sell that capacity to others), the market treats Meta's spending as a pure cost center. Every dollar Meta spends on AI only sees a return if it improves its own products, lacking the direct revenue potential of a cloud platform.

Rather than simply failing to police fraud, Meta perversely profits from it by charging higher rates for ads its systems suspect are fraudulent. This 'scam tax' creates a direct financial incentive to allow illicit ads, turning a blind eye into a lucrative revenue stream.

Unlike competitors who would struggle to introduce ads into AI chat, Meta's user base is already accustomed to ads in their feeds. This gives Meta a unique advantage to monetize a proactive consumer AI agent that can surface sponsored suggestions for shopping or travel without creating user friction.

While the market awaits new AI-native products from Meta, its real AI success is in its core business. A 9% CPM increase in a weak economy indicates its ad-serving algorithm's effectiveness improved by double digits in a single quarter, a massive financial win.

The AI buildout is forcing mega-cap tech companies to abandon their high-margin, asset-light models for a CapEx-heavy approach. This transition is increasingly funded by debt, not cash flow, which fundamentally alters their risk profile and valuation logic, as seen in Meta's stock drop after raising CapEx guidance.

Tech giants are no longer funding AI capital expenditures solely with their massive free cash flow. They are increasingly turning to debt issuance, which fundamentally alters their risk profile. This introduces default risk and requires a repricing of their credit spreads and equity valuations.

Once considered safe due to low CapEx and recurring revenue models, the technology sector now shows significant credit stress. Investors allowed higher leverage on these companies, but the sharp rise in interest rates in 2022 exposed this vulnerability, placing tech alongside historically troubled sectors like media and retail.

Internal Meta documents project that 10% of the company's total annual revenue, or $16 billion, comes from advertising for scams and banned goods. This reframes fraud not as a peripheral problem but as a significant, core component of Meta's advertising business model.

Attempts to pressure platforms like Meta by targeting their advertisers are ineffective. Meta's strength lies in its highly diversified advertiser ecosystem, where no single company accounts for a significant portion of revenue. This fragmentation means even a coordinated effort lacks the concentrated power to inflict meaningful financial damage.