According to the Kalecki-Levy equation, gross investment spending immediately becomes revenue for another company. Unlike consumption-driven revenue which has immediate wage costs, the cost of investment (depreciation) is recognized slowly over time, creating a powerful, immediate boost to aggregate corporate profits.
While high capex is often seen as a negative, for giants like Alphabet and Microsoft, it functions as a powerful moat in the AI race. The sheer scale of spending—tens of billions annually—is something most companies cannot afford, effectively limiting the field of viable competitors.
While aggregate gross investment numbers look strong due to the AI boom, this hides weakness in classic cyclical sectors like residential investment, construction, and industrial equipment. This divergence creates opportunities for trades like long tech/short energy, which capitalizes on the two-speed economy.
For 2026, AI's primary economic effect is fueling demand through massive investment in infrastructure like data centers. The widely expected productivity gains that would lower inflation (the supply-side effect) won't materialize for a few years, creating a short-term inflationary pressure from heightened business spending.
The narrative of AI destroying jobs misses a key point: AI allows companies to 'hire software for a dollar' for tasks that were never economical to assign to humans. This will unlock new services and expand the economy, creating demand in areas that previously didn't exist.
Hyperscalers are extending depreciation schedules for AI hardware. While this may look like "cooking the books" to inflate earnings, it's justified by the reality that even 7-8 year old TPUs and GPUs are still running at 100% utilization for less complex AI tasks, making them valuable for longer and validating the accounting change.
Historically, labor costs dwarfed software spending. As AI automates tasks, software budgets will balloon, turning into a primary corporate expense. This forces CFOs to scrutinize software ROI with the same rigor they once applied only to their workforce.
While the current AI phase is all about capital spending, a future catalyst for a downturn will emerge when the depreciation and amortization schedules for this hardware kick in. Unlike long-lasting infrastructure like railroads, short-term tech assets will create a significant financial drag in a few years.
Current AI spending appears bubble-like, but it's not propping up unprofitable operations. Inference is already profitable. The immense cash burn is a deliberate, forward-looking investment in developing future, more powerful models, not a sign of a failing business model. This re-frames the financial risk.
History shows a significant delay between tech investment and productivity gains—10 years for PCs, 5-6 for the internet. The current AI CapEx boom faces a similar risk. An 'AI wobble' may occur when impatient investors begin questioning the long-delayed returns.
The AI infrastructure boom is a potential house of cards. A single dollar of end-user revenue paid to a company like OpenAI can become $8 of "seeming revenue" as it cascades through the value chain to Microsoft, CoreWeave, and NVIDIA, supporting an unsustainable $100 of equity market value.