Repro Novo licensed a drug that did not meet its primary endpoint in a prior Phase 2b trial. They identified a positive signal in an exploratory endpoint—improved semen quality—and built their new clinical strategy around making that the primary endpoint, salvaging a potentially valuable asset.
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Ipsen's drug Icorvo, which failed in the large NASH market, found unexpected success in the rare liver disease PBC. The smaller market is growing faster than anticipated due to physicians treating patients earlier and a key competitor being withdrawn. This demonstrates how a failed asset can be repurposed for a highly successful niche application.
After years of focusing on de-risked late-stage products, the M&A market is showing a renewed appetite for risk. Recent large deals for early-stage and platform companies signal a return to an era where buyers gamble on foundational science.
Recent biotech deals are setting new valuation records for companies at specific early stages: preclinical (AbbVie/Capstan, ~$2B), Phase 1 (J&J/Halda, $3B), and pre-Phase 3 (Novartis/Abitivi, $12B). This signals intense demand for de-risked innovation well before late-stage data is available.
The acquisition of Verona shows that a novel mechanism of action with a substantial clinical effect can make a company a prime M&A target. This holds true even with weaknesses like no composition of matter patent or an unfashionable drug delivery method, especially in disease areas lacking innovation.
Despite a pivotal data readout pending, an acquisition of Abivax could happen beforehand. Historical deals like Merck's acquisition of Prometheus and Pfizer's of Arena show that large pharma companies are willing to 'roll the dice' and pay a premium for pre-data assets when their conviction in the science is high.
To save money, Rhythm's leadership considered canceling a clinical study because the prevailing scientific logic suggested their drug wouldn't work. The study's unexpected, resounding success became the company's pivotal turning point, highlighting the value of pursuing scientifically contrarian ideas.
Repro Novo's co-founders invested their own money for the costly process of finding and negotiating assets. This allowed them to secure a promising candidate before approaching institutional investors, demonstrating strong conviction and de-risking the initial investment for VCs.
Contrary to market convention, a trial delay can be a bullish signal. When an independent data monitoring committee (IDMC) recommends adding more patients, as with Bristol's ADEPT-2 study, it implies they've seen a therapeutic signal worth salvaging, potentially increasing the trial's ultimate chance of success.
GSK's CSO reveals their "bolt-on" deal-making focuses on late-stage clinical assets that may have failed trials or have suboptimal profiles. They acquire these assets when they believe a better trial design or repositioning can unlock the molecule's true potential, as exemplified by their acquisition of Momalotinib.
Ipsen avoids the high-risk, capital-intensive phase of basic research. Instead, its R&D strategy focuses on licensing promising drug candidates from universities and biotechs. The company then leverages its expertise in later-stage development, including toxicology, manufacturing scale-up (CMC), and clinical trials, to bring these de-risked assets to market.