Selling in a downturn is driven by two distinct forces: voluntary panic from seeing portfolios in the red and consuming negative media, or forced sales (margin calls, foreclosures) when investors have used too much debt and can't cover their positions.
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Ray Dalio argues bubbles burst due to a mechanical liquidity crisis, not just a realization of flawed fundamentals. When asset holders are forced to sell their "wealth" (e.g., stocks) for "money" (cash) simultaneously—for taxes or other needs—the lack of sufficient buyers triggers the collapse.
The 1920s bubble was uniquely driven by the new concept of retail leverage. Financial institutions transported the nascent idea of buying cars on credit to the stock market, allowing individuals to buy stocks with as little as 10% down, creating unprecedented and fragile speculation.
Economic downturns cause panic, leading people to sell valuable assets like stocks and real estate at a discount. Those with cash and financial knowledge can acquire these assets cheaply, creating significant wealth. It becomes a Black Friday for investors.
The primary driver of market fluctuations is the dramatic shift in attitudes toward risk. In good times, investors become risk-tolerant and chase gains ('Risk is my friend'). In bad times, risk aversion dominates ('Get me out at any price'). This emotional pendulum causes security prices to fluctuate far more than their underlying intrinsic values.
According to Andrew Ross Sorkin, while bad actors and speculation are always present, the single element that transforms a market downturn into a systemic financial crisis is excessive leverage. Without it, the system can absorb shocks; with it, a domino effect is inevitable, making guardrails against leverage paramount.
Contrary to popular belief, the 1929 crash wasn't an instantaneous event. It took a full year for public confidence to erode and for the new reality to set in. This illustrates that markets can absorb financial shocks, but they cannot withstand a sustained, spiraling loss of confidence.
Media outlets are incentivized to generate clicks through hype and fear. This creates a distorted view of the market, causing retail investors to panic-sell during downturns and FOMO-buy during bubbles. The reality is usually somewhere in the less-exciting middle.
Contrary to intuition, widespread fear and discussion of a market bubble often precede a final, insane surge upward. The real crash tends to happen later, when the consensus shifts to believing in a 'new economic model.' This highlights a key psychological dynamic of market cycles where peak anxiety doesn't signal an immediate top.
While low rates make borrowing to invest (leverage) seem seductive, it's exceptionally dangerous in an economy driven by debt management. Abrupt policy shifts can cause sudden volatility and dry up liquidity overnight, triggering margin calls and forcing sales at the worst possible times. Wealth is transferred from the over-leveraged to the liquid during these resets.
Counterintuitively, the wealthiest individuals suffer the largest losses during financial bubbles because they are the most leveraged at the peak with the most wealth to compress. The common narrative that retail investors are hurt the most is often incorrect.
