Most of an index's returns come from a tiny fraction of its component stocks (e.g., 7% of the Russell 3000). The goal of indexing isn't just diversification; it's a strategy to ensure you own the unpredictable "tail-event" winners, like the next Amazon, that are nearly impossible to identify in advance.

Contrary to popular belief, the market may be getting less efficient. The dominance of indexing, quant funds, and multi-manager pods—all with short time horizons—creates dislocations. This leaves opportunities for long-term investors to buy valuable assets that are neglected because their path to value creation is uncertain.

Market-cap-weighted indexes create a perverse momentum loop. As a stock's price rises, its weight in the index increases, forcing new passive capital to buy more of it at inflated prices. This mechanism is the structural opposite of a value-oriented 'buy low, sell high' discipline.

Proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis, which hold immense influence over index fund votes, are recommending against Musk's pay package. These are the same organizations that have been the primary drivers of DEI and ESG mandates in corporate America, illustrating their broad power.

The underperformance of active managers in the last decade wasn't just due to the rise of indexing. The historic run of a few mega-cap tech stocks created a market-cap-weighted index that was statistically almost impossible to beat without owning those specific names, leading to lower active share and alpha dispersion.

The financial industry systematically funnels average investors into index funds not just for efficiency, but from a belief that 'mom and pop savers are considered too stupid to handle their own money.' This creates a system where the wealthy receive personalized stock advice and white-glove treatment, while smaller investors get a generic, low-effort solution that limits their potential wealth.

While indexing made competition tougher, the true headwind for active managers was the unprecedented, concentrated performance of a few tech giants. Not owning them was statistically devastating, while owning them reduced active share, creating a no-win scenario for many funds.

Harvard's John Coates reveals that 'private' equity funds primarily invest public money from pensions and endowments. The 'private' label is a brilliant marketing strategy that allows them to avoid the public disclosure and scrutiny that should accompany managing millions of workers' savings.

Basic efficiency—doing things in bulk is cheaper—drives the growth of massive index and private equity funds. Harvard's John Coates argues this economic good creates a political problem, as the resulting concentration of influence in a few firms is at odds with the democratic principle of dispersed power.