Maximilien Robespierre's fatal miscalculation before the National Convention was threatening an unstated list of corrupt deputies without naming them. Rather than cowing his targets into submission, this ambiguity forced every deputy who had taken bribes or overstepped during the Terror to assume they were on his hit list. Driven by fear of execution, disparate rivals united to pre-emptively shout him down and demand his arrest.

Radicals like Collot d'Herbois and Billaud-Varenne overthrew Robespierre expecting to control the Committee of Public Safety and maintain the Terror without him. However, eliminating Robespierre dismantled the fear holding the Convention captive. Moderate deputies quickly abolished emergency measures, stripped the committees of their powers, closed the Jacobin Club, and ultimately arrested the very conspirators who initiated the coup, illustrating how removing a figurehead can trigger uncontrollable systemic collapse.

Robespierre built his political dominance on solemn, unyielding moral righteousness, but Marc-Guillaume Vadier dismantled his aura on the convention floor through mockery. By parodying Robespierre's self-pity and highlighting his connection to the eccentric prophetess Catherine Théot, Vadier prompted widespread laughter. Having no sense of humor, Robespierre was completely unable to respond, losing his composure and his voice as the assembly turned against him.

In an era of rampant bribery and shifting allegiances, Robespierre stood out for his fierce moral standards and refusal to be bribed. This consistency and perceived virtue, not charisma, earned him immense respect and made him a symbol of the revolution's ideals, lending crucial legitimacy to the Committee of Public Safety.

Although Robespierre viewed revolutionary dictatorship as a temporary measure until the hyper-democratic 1793 Constitution could take effect, he could never declare the emergency over. He trapped himself in an ideological bind where terror was required to enforce virtue. Because he suspected that those displaying outward virtue were likely the most insidious counter-revolutionaries, no standard of civic purity could ever be achieved to justify releasing executive control.

Initially, terror was framed as a defensive emergency measure to combat war and counter-revolution. However, a more radical view, championed by Robespierre, saw terror as a positive, offensive force—a "bloodbath" necessary to purge society of old corruptions and build a new, virtuous state from the ashes.

By repeatedly threatening an unspecified cabal of conspirators in the Jacobin Club and the Convention without naming individuals, Robespierre made every deputy feel directly endangered. Politicians who previously shared little common ground—corrupt deputies, ultra-left de-Christianizers, and moderates—became convinced they were marked men. This collective terror incentivized them to coalesce around operators like Fouché to strike preemptively against Robespierre before he struck them.

While technocrats on the Committee of Public Safety drafted hundreds of decrees on three hours of sleep, Robespierre retreated home for six weeks, periodically reappearing only to lecture colleagues on morality. As historian R.R. Palmer noted, isolating oneself virtuously while leaving the grinding operational burden to others fatally undermines a leader's authority. His colleagues came to see his moralizing as self-indulgence rather than leadership.

A dictator's attempts to consolidate power by purging potential rivals are counterproductive. This strategy creates a culture of fear where subordinates are too afraid to deliver bad news, isolating the leader from ground truth. This lack of accurate information increases the risk of catastrophic miscalculation and eventual downfall.