The city wasn't simply bad at accounting; it effectively had no centralized system. Finances were tracked on scraps of paper and in drawers, making it impossible to know the true state of its debt. This systemic failure, not just policy choices, made the collapse inevitable.
Moses pioneered using independent authorities to issue bonds for infrastructure, sequestering revenue streams like tolls away from the city's general fund. This model starved public transit and other services, creating a structural vulnerability that contributed significantly to the 1970s fiscal crisis long after he was gone.
The SVB crisis wasn't a traditional bank run caused by bad loans. It was the first instance where the speed of the internet and digital fund transfers outpaced regulatory reaction, turning a manageable asset-liability mismatch into a systemic crisis. This highlights a new type of technological 'tail risk' for modern banking.
Silicon Valley Bank was already a member of deposit networks that could have prevented its collapse. However, 94% of its deposits remained uninsured because the bank failed to actually use the tools at its disposal. This reveals that the mere existence of a solution is worthless without proper implementation, integration, and incentives for adoption within an organization.
Unlike most countries that fund legislation upon passing it, the U.S. Congress passes laws first and separately debates funding later. This fundamental disconnect between approving work and approving payment is a structural flaw that repeatedly manufactures fiscal crises and government shutdowns.
In a final, desperate move, the very unions whose members were being laid off became the city's lenders of last resort. By investing their pension funds in the newly created MAC bonds, they effectively bailed out their own employer, a high-stakes move that ultimately averted total bankruptcy.
Beyond headline-grabbing scandals, the most insidious impact of a kleptocratic administration is its refusal to enforce existing laws, from financial regulations to anti-corruption acts. This quiet dismantling of the legal framework fosters a culture of impunity where bad actors thrive, ultimately harming ordinary people and destabilizing the entire system.
Ford's refusal to bail out New York wasn't purely a fiscal decision. It was a strategic political move to outflank Ronald Reagan on the right ahead of the 1976 Republican primary. This shows how national political calculations can directly and severely impact municipal-level crises.
The debate over CUNY's free tuition was more than a line item. For bankers, it symbolized fiscal irresponsibility. For New Yorkers, it represented the city's social contract and a path to mobility, crystallizing two competing visions for the city's future and what it means to be a citizen.
The crisis was a tipping point in American political thought. The preceding era was defined by the 'Great Society' belief in robust government services. The bailout's conditions, forcing deep cuts, signaled the dawn of a new 40-year consensus prioritizing austerity and fiscal conservatism over public spending.
While President Ford never uttered the words, the infamous headline created a common enemy. This external threat helped galvanize a city whose internal factions—unions, bankers, politicians—were at each other's throats, fostering a necessary sense of shared purpose to overcome the crisis.