A large pharmaceutical company like AbbVie issuing an official public statement to deny acquisition talks is highly unusual. This strange move paradoxically suggests that the target, Revolution Medicines, is very likely in active deal discussions, just not with AbbVie. The public denial serves as a strong, albeit indirect, signal to the market that the company is in play.
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After years of focusing on de-risked late-stage products, the M&A market is showing a renewed appetite for risk. Recent large deals for early-stage and platform companies signal a return to an era where buyers gamble on foundational science.
Recent biotech deals are setting new valuation records for companies at specific early stages: preclinical (AbbVie/Capstan, ~$2B), Phase 1 (J&J/Halda, $3B), and pre-Phase 3 (Novartis/Abitivi, $12B). This signals intense demand for de-risked innovation well before late-stage data is available.
The acquisition of Verona shows that a novel mechanism of action with a substantial clinical effect can make a company a prime M&A target. This holds true even with weaknesses like no composition of matter patent or an unfashionable drug delivery method, especially in disease areas lacking innovation.
Despite a pivotal data readout pending, an acquisition of Abivax could happen beforehand. Historical deals like Merck's acquisition of Prometheus and Pfizer's of Arena show that large pharma companies are willing to 'roll the dice' and pay a premium for pre-data assets when their conviction in the science is high.
Competitive bidding wars for biotech companies are not isolated incidents. They are a clear indicator of heightened market aggression and the intense pressure large pharmaceutical firms feel to acquire assets and drive growth ahead of major patent expirations.
The adage 'biotech companies are bought, not sold' means an acquisition is typically not the result of a company actively seeking a buyer. As with Portola's sale to Alexion, it is often a fiduciary responsibility to consider an unsolicited offer, even if the internal plan is independent growth.
The "takeout candidate" thesis often fails because corporate development teams at large firms won't risk their careers on optically cheap but unprofitable assets. They prefer to overpay for proven, de-risked companies later, making cheapness a poor indicator of an impending acquisition.
With patent cliffs looming and mature assets acquired, large pharmaceutical companies are increasingly paying billion-dollar prices for early-stage and even preclinical companies. This marks a significant strategic shift in M&A towards accepting higher risk for earlier innovation.
Recent acquisitions, like the bids for Avidel and Cedara, have involved rare, publicly competitive bidding wars. This shift indicates a more heated and aggressive M&A environment where acquirers are willing to fight openly for strategic assets, a departure from typical private negotiations.
M&A is often framed as a win, but it can be detrimental to patients. The acquisition of an aggressive, fast-moving biotech by a large pharma company can lead to slowed development timelines and more conservative regulatory strategies, ultimately delaying access to life-saving treatments.