Western pharma firms strategically license assets from Chinese biotechs while leaving China rights with the local partner. This leverages China's faster, cheaper clinical development, as the partner tests the molecule in new indications, generating valuable data that de-risks the asset for the global firm at no extra cost.

A notable trend is the licensing of advanced clinical assets from Chinese biotechs to major global pharmaceutical companies for ex-China rights. Deals like Roche licensing Medilink's Phase 3 ADC and AbbVie licensing Reamgen's Phase 2 bispecific antibody signal China's evolution from a market to a source of high-value, late-stage innovation.

The failure of Novartis's antisense drug Pella Carson, contrasted with the potential success of Amgen's siRNA targeting the same pathway, could have a profound negative impact on the entire antisense field, favoring siRNA technology for large population diseases.

K-36's lead drug was acquired from Novartis not because it was a failed asset, but because it became available during a strategic reorganization. This illustrates a key opportunity for biotech startups: licensing promising preclinical assets that no longer fit a large pharmaceutical company's immediate development focus.

In multiple instances where siRNA and ASO (antisense) therapies have been developed for the same indication, the siRNA drug has emerged with a superior overall profile across efficacy, safety, and dosing convenience. This pattern suggests siRNA is solidifying its position as the more advantageous modality.

While innovation from China is increasingly integrated into Western pharma pipelines, there's little expectation of outright acquisitions of Chinese companies. The consensus is that licensing a specific asset is far simpler and avoids the significant political and regulatory complexities of a full M&A transaction.

Big Pharma is increasingly licensing assets from Chinese biotechs, putting the region on par with Europe as a source of innovation. However, outright M&A of Chinese firms is a complete non-starter. This reflects a bifurcated strategy: pharma will partner for assets but avoids the geopolitical and logistical headaches of acquisitions, creating a 'license-only' pipeline from China.

Even while its antisense drug Pella Carson was in a major Phase 3 trial, Novartis proactively licensed a competing siRNA technology for the same target. This suggests a sophisticated hedging strategy or internal doubts about the original drug's prospects, a move made years before the trial's failure.

If Amgen's siRNA drug succeeds where Novartis's antisense oligo (ASO) failed for the same LP(a) target, it could be a decisive blow to ASO technology. This would bolster the view that siRNA's superior target knockdown and less frequent dosing make it the preferred modality for large-population diseases, relegating ASOs to niche orphan indications.